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SYMPOSIUM
PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND THE
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: THE ROLE
OF THE BRADY RULE IN THE
MODERN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
Lewis R. Katzt
An argument often made over the last half century against the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is that ordinary citizens lose
faith in the criminal justice system when guilty defendants go free
because reliable evidence of guilt is suppressed when police violate a
defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.'
That may be the case. However, ordinary citizens and lawyers and
judges alike should be truly alarmed when they see the criminal
justice system unable to distinguish between innocent and guilty
defendants. The credibility of the criminal justice system is
completely dependant upon its ability to ensure that innocent people
are not convicted.
It is too late in the day to believe that innocent defendants are not
convicted of crimes in America, nor can we avoid the fact that
innocent defendants have been convicted not just as a result of
innocent errors. The release of defendants exonerated after years in
t John C. Hutchins Professor of Law; Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
I See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984) ("Indiscriminate application of the
exclusionary rule, therefore, may well 'generat[e] disrespect for the law and the administration
of justice.'").
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prison is evidence of a system that eventually works, but, at the same
time, it is also evidence of a system that is subject to terrible error
resulting in costly human tragedy. It raises ongoing questions about
those who may languish in prison wrongfully convicted and never
exonerated. It is fashionable to joke about how all prisoners are
innocent-just ask them. But tragically, some are.
The rules governing prosecutors are few and direct. A prosecutor
may not deliberately misrepresent the truth as in Miller v. Pate, where
the prosecutor represented a pair of shorts found a mile away from the
murder scene as blood-stained even though the prosecutor knew the
stains were paint-not blood. The state used a chemist from the State
Bureau of Crime Identification who testified that the stains were
blood, and the prosecutor referenced the blood-stained shorts in his
final argument. The Supreme Court said that "The Fourteenth
Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by
the knowing use of false evidence.' 2 Forty years later issues
concerning the integrity of some crime labs persist.
The due process clause also requires the prosecutor to correct
perjured testimony.3 Moreover, the prosecutor's duty does not stop
with the direct facts of the crime itself, but extends to perjured
testimony that goes to matters of credibility-such as when the
witness denies that he has received a promise of leniency or other
compensation in return for his testimony.4 Yet, almost a half century
later, cases still arise where witnesses misrepresent what they receive
in return for their testimony, and prosecutors remain silent or, worse,
participate in that misrepresentation.5
These rules are intended to promote the reliability of the
guilt-determining process by reducing the possibilities for wrongful
convictions. It is an outrage that violations of these most basic duties
continue to occur today because they are such basic trip wires
intended to prevent miscarriages of justice. A prosecutor may not
knowingly use perjured testimony.6 Perjury creates the same duty
whether it goes to an essential fact of the case or to a collateral matter.
The prosecutor must correct a witness's false statement that he had
not received a promise of leniency in return for his testimony.7
Moreover, the prosecuting attorney's ignorance is no excuse. The
prosecuting attorney trying a case has a duty to find out whether
2 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
3 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
4 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
6 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
7 Napue, 360 U.S. 264.
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promises have been made to her witnesses.8 Any other rule would
encourage willful blindness on the part of the attorney trying the case
Yet anyone who was around the Cuyahoga County Courthouse long
after the decisions in Napue and Giglio knows that accomplices and
jailhouse snitches routinely deny that any promises had been made,
and prosecuting attorneys equally routinely let those denials stand
without correction. The continued importance of jailhouse snitch
testimony and incidences of jailhouse snitch perjury indicate that we
have not come very far in our pursuit of ensuring that juries be made
aware of the currency of exchange for testimony.
We certainly have not eradicated the perjury issue, but in 1963, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that the prosecutor's duty to
see that justice is done involved more than just correcting perjured
testimony. In Brady v. Maryland, the Court said:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.
9
Brady is as important for the type of evidence involved as it was for
the holding. The evidence was not a bombshell that would have
exonerated the defendant. At Brady's trial, he admitted to
participation in the felony. His attorney conceded his guilt on the
felony-murder charge but insisted that Brady's accomplice committed
the murder.
Brady's attorney requested to see statements made by the
accomplice. Several statements were produced but not the one where
the accomplice admitted shooting the victim. The withheld confession
also implicated Brady in the murder, indicating that Brady wanted to
strangle the victim. It was questionable how much the accomplice's
confession would help Brady in the punishment determination of life
or death. Not much is clear from Brady except the general principle
that 1) the prosecutor has a duty to disclose 2) evidence favorable to
an accused 3) upon a request of a defendant 4) that is material to
questions of guilt or punishment. The Court did not define
materiality. Brady seemed to stand for, though unstated in the
opinion, a broad test of materiality: that the evidence which the
prosecutor must produce need only be helpful; it need not be clearly
decisive. A jury exposed to the accomplice's confession admitting
8 Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
9 Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 87(1963).
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that he shot the victim could still return a death sentence against
Brady. In Giglio v. United States, the Brady duty to disclose was
extended to impeachment evidence.' 0
Brady seemed to herald a new day and a recognition of a
prosecutor's higher duty to see justice done even beyond the
not-insignificant task of correcting perjured testimony. It is the
prosecutor who knows or should know, despite heavy caseloads and
insufficient preparation time, where the weak spots and
inconsistencies are in case files. The prosecutor or the police know
when witnesses have come forward with information that does not
match the suspect who became the defendant. It is the prosecutor or
the prosecutor's investigator who knows of inconsistencies in
statements made by witnesses who will be called at trial and whose
memories had to be refreshed in order to overcome those
inconsistencies. It is the natural competitive nature of the adversary to
want only the favorable evidence to surface at trial. But it is the
higher duty of the prosecutor under Brady to ensure that justice is
done, and that favorable evidence for the defendant is disclosed to the
defense attorney. That favorable evidence, under these circumstances,
is the inconsistencies, so that the defense attorney can cross-examine
the witness about those inconsistent statements. Brady conditioned
that duty upon a request from the defense so that the prosecutor was
not obligated to prepare the defense counsel's case. However, the
condition made the duty non-existent when defense counsel had no
knowledge of the favorable evidence. The natural response to such a
rule was for defense attorneys to make broad general requests for "all
Brady material."
The Supreme Court's next step was to create a three part test in
United States v. Agurs,I1 which distinguished between specific
requests, as the one made in Brady, and general requests. The Court
began to backtrack on the meaning of materiality. In Agurs, the Court
divided Brady into three categories:
(1)Where a prosecution witness commits perjury, the
prosecuting attorney has an obligation to come forward with
information without a request from the defense attorney.
Where the prosecuting attorney fails to do so, a resulting
conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury.
10 Giglio, 405 U.S. 150.
" 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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(2) Where, as in Brady, there is a specific request for
favorable information which is ignored, the same test must be
applied as for perjury: the resulting conviction must be set
aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the withheld
evidence would have affected the jury's judgment. The Court
said there is rarely a reasonable excuse to ignore a specific,
relevant request.
(3) Where there is a general request for all Brady material or
no request at all, the prosecutor has a limited duty to disclose
obviously exculpatory material. Here the standard for
materiality and, hence, reversal is whether the undisclosed
evidence creates a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not
otherwise exist. That determination is made within the
context of the entire record. Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissented arguing that the Court's standard undermined the
role of the jury allowing the judge to determine whether the
withheld evidence probably would have resulted in an
acquittal.1
2
The years since Brady and Agurs have not strengthened the
prosecutor's duty to disclose and see that justice is done. Since Agurs,
the Court has substantially watered down the prosecutors duty, or at
least diminished the consequences for failing to turn over favorable
evidence to the defense. The Court eliminated the tougher test for
materiality when a prosecutor fails to comply with specific request.
In United States v. Bagley, 3 the government ignored a specific
request and withheld information that two principal prosecution
witnesses had contracts with the ATF for money for information.
Instead the government purposely mislead the defense counsel by
producing false affidavits from the witnesses that they had no
promises of rewards. Rather than recognize the egregiousness of the
prosecutor's behavior, the Supreme Court diminished the standard for
evaluating such behavior. The Court eliminated the distinction
between specific and general requests and applied the lesser standard
to both: a conviction will be reversed "only if there is a reasonable
probability that had the evidence been disclosed the result would have
been different."'
14
Although the United States Supreme Court has said that when in
doubt a prosecutor should disclose, the rules do not encourage
12 Id
" 473 U.S. 667 (1975).
14 Id. at 682 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
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disclosure and are not helpful. Rather than encouraging pretrial
disclosure of favorable evidence material to questions of guilt or
punishment, these rules encourage prosecutors not to disclose. The
result is not pretrial disclosure, but years of post-conviction
proceedings in an attempt to discover evidence that should have been
disclosed. Convictions are overturned only where the failures to
disclose were truly egregious. 15 My friends and former students who
are or who have been prosecuting attorneys always tell me that I do
not understand when we discuss this subject. They tell me that their
caseload is overwhelming and they do not have time to prepare their
own cases, let alone prepare the defense attorneys' cases for them.
They also assure me that they are not in the business of convicting
innocent defendants. While that last assurance is admirable, they miss
the point. They are deciding who is innocent and who is guilty. They
make mistakes, and they are crippling the adversary system. Ohio is
like every other state. Defendants have been convicted where
evidence was withheld at trial.
One such case is State v. Larkins,16 where the defendant was
convicted of a 1981 robbery and murder in 1986. For years he tried
unsuccessfully to gain access to police reports in his case. Bishop
Alfred Nickles of Cincinnati filed a public records request with the
Cleveland Police Department in 1999 and, without objection from the
prosecutor, received the reports. The police reports revealed that: 1)
the description of the robbers given by eyewitnesses did not match
Larkins; 2) a description of "Road Dog," the second shooter, given by
a potential suspect, Todd Hicks, did not match Larkins as to height,
complexion or hair style; 3) the police relied on a confidential
informant; 4) a witness, Sonja Belcher, who was present when the
robbery was planned, did not identify Larkins as one of the planners,
and said she saw both robbers after it was known Larkins left town; 5)
Henderson, a co-defendant who turned state's witness, named Larkins
only after the police told her that Larkins was known by the
nickname, "Road Dog;" and 6) Henderson lied on the stand
concerning her past criminal convictions. Moreover, it was also
discovered that Henderson lied when asked whether the State had
promised her anything in exchange for her testimony. Although
Henderson claimed she was testifying without any promises from the
State, the Assistant Prosecutor wrote a letter on her behalf to the
parole board, indicating that he promised her that he "would do
everything possible to help her get off parole" because she was
15 Cf Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
16 2006 WL 60778 (Ohio App. 8th 2006).
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initially reluctant to return to Ohio to testify at trial. The Court of
Common Please granted a new trial which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. When the case was remanded for a new trial, the state
continued to argue for four years that the police records were
non-discoverable and could not be used at the new trial. During that
four-year delay, two witnesses died and others disappeared.
Ultimately, the trial judge dismissed the indictment as the appropriate
remedy rather than order a retrial of the defendant. The Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal order.17
Even DNA testing that excludes a defendant from the crime that he
has been convicted of has not always resulted in the prosecution's
admitting error in Ohio. Fred Luckett was convicted as a serial rapist
in 1979. At trial and for more than twenty years thereafter, Luckett
maintained his innocence. A rape kit was done on the first victim, and
a laboratory slide from the kit was found in the hospital twenty years
later, with the first victim's name etched on the slide, just before it
was to be destroyed. The slide was made from a vaginal swab
smeared on to its glass surface just 90 minutes after the first rape. A
leading DNA laboratory in Maryland determined that the semen
preserved on the slide was not Luckett's. The victim of this rape, a 52
year old widow, identified Luckett as the rapist. Rape kits were not
done on the second and third victims. All three victims identified
Luckett as the rapist. He was convicted at trial and pleaded no contest
to the third rape on the promise of no additional time.
A motion for a new trial was filed based upon the DNA test. At the
hearing on the motion for a new trial, the state claimed that the DNA
test was inconclusive because there was no reason to believe that the
rapist had ejaculated or that the victim had not engaged in consensual
17 Id. at 9-10 ("Finally, we agree that Larkins has suffered prejudice from the state's
discovery violation, and that this is the extraordinary case where the prejudice cannot be cured
by a new trial. Almost 20 years have elapsed since the 1986 trial. The court noted that eight
witnesses for the defense were deceased, six witnesses for the defense had unknown addresses,
and 10 witnesses for the state were without addresses. Larkins' inability to present these
witnesses speaks for itself, wholly apart from issues relating to the typical degradation of
memories occurring over long periods of time. Ordinarily, those witnesses who previously
testified but are now unavailable could have their prior testimony presented under Evid.R.
804(B)(1). But to do so in a retrial of this case would be useless as none of the witnesses who
gave the prior testimony could be questioned about the exculpatory evidence withheld in the
case. In short, to conduct a new trial at this stage would be meaningless as Larkins' ability to
use the exculpatory evidence would be negligible, at best, thus making the retrial itself futile.
We therefore find that the court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the indictment as a
sanction for the state's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence under Crim. R. 16(B)(1)(f). In
arriving at this conclusion, nothing we have said here should be construed as a comment on the
outcome of the first trial. The dismissal of an indictment as a sanction for a discovery violation
is not the same thing as the reversal of a conviction for want of sufficient evidence."); see also
THE OHIO ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, BROKEN DUTY: A HISTORICAL GUIDE To
THE FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE BY OHIO PROSECUTORS 1 (2005).
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sex with another person. However, at the original trial, prosecutors
introduced the slide to show that the victim was raped. That victim
died since the first trial and was unavailable to testify. The victim's
son testified that after she was widowed, his mother had no social life
and was very unlikely to have engaged in consensual sex. The judge
who presided at the first trial granted the motion for the new trial, and
the state appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the order granting a
new trial, and Luckett remained in prison until he was paroled. 8
What should be the penalty for a prosecutor's purposeful failure to
disclose favorable evidence to the trial court and to the defendant?
Disciplinary action was taken against an assistant prosecutor who was
prosecuting a child rape and molestation case. At a pretrial hearing,
18 State v. Luckett, 761 N.E.2d 105, 112 (Ohio App. 8th 2001) ("There is simply no
evidence in the record either that the individual who raped Martin ejaculated during the
commission of the offense and/or that Martin was not otherwise sexually active at the time of
the rape. Although appellee was asked to address these issues both by the trial court in its order
granting an evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial, and by this court during oral
argument, nothing more than speculation has been offered. We cannot presume that a rape
victim is not sexually active at the time of the offense merely because she was fifty-one or
fifty-two years old at the time she was victimized. Without answers to these questions the DNA
evidence offered by the appellee is of little probative value and is insufficient to establish a
strong probability of a different result in the eventuality of a new trial."); but see id. at 117-118
(Cooney, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding the fact that the record as a whole supports the trial
court's decision to grant a new trial, the majority argues that the trial court should have required
appellee to present evidence as to the source of the sperm that was found on the first victim and
on her clothing hours after the attack, and should have determined whether the victim had
consensual intercourse within forty-eight hours of the rape. It is uncontradicted that at the
hearing on the motion for leave to file the motion for new trial, the trial court stated that the
parties would be required to produce the evidence described above.
Essentially, the majority is placing the burden solely on the appellee to produce evidence
outside his counsel's capability. It is important to note that the first victim is no longer alive;
therefore, there is no way for the appellee to obtain information about any consensual sexual
partners she may have had at the time of the attack. Furthermore, it was not the appellee's
burden at trial, nor is it now his burden, to prove his innocence. Instead, as with all criminal
trials, it was the prosecutor's burden to prove appellee's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Two
theories of the source of the sperm have been set forth. First, as argued by the state at trial, the
sperm belonged to the rapist. The majority argues that although DNA testing was unavailable,
that the appellee should have used the secretion blood-type test to "potentially rule himself out
as a suspect." The majority also implies that the appellee did not do so for strategic reasons.
However, it was not the burden of the appellee to prove his innocence at trial; it was the state's
burden to prove his guilt. Thus, if this test existed, the state could have used the secretion
blood-type test which would have helped in determining the source of the sperm. However, the
state also made a strategic choice not to test the sperm that was found on the rape victim within
two hours of her attack. The second theory presented by the majority is that the sperm in
question did not belong to the rapist at all but that its source was a possible consensual partner
of the first victim. As noted by the majority, the purpose of a rape kit is to gather physical
evidence. R.C. 2907.29. The sperm sample in question came from the prosecutor's evidence.
Thus, as part of its investigation it was the role of the medical personnel or law enforcement
officers to question the victim as to her other sexual partners as a means of identifying the
source of the sperm. If the state had asked such routine questions of the victim, the prosecution
would have been able to make a strong argument as to the source of the sperm. By contrast, it
was not the appellee's role at trial to interrogate the victim as to her sexual habits.").
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the assistant prosecutor falsely represented that DNA test results of
semen on the victim's shirt had not come back when, in fact, he had
been told that the test results indicated that the semen on the shirt was
not the defendant's but the complainant-boy's. The assistant
prosecutor also failed to inform the defense attorney during the plea
negotiation and a plea hearing and sentencing that the boy had
changed his story and acknowledged that the semen on the shirt was
his own. The assistant prosecutor was suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six months. The defendant ended up entering the
same plea and receiving the same sentence. 19
The issues that will be discussed in the following pages go to the
very integrity of the criminal justice system. The prosecuting attorney
has the key role in seeing that justice is done. The authors and
panelists you will be reading are on the cutting edge of these issues. I
want to thank them for their participation in this symposium.
19 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 99 Ohio St. 3d 222 (2003) ("[T]he respondent
knew that the DNA testing had been completed and that it was not [the defendant's] semen on
the victim's shirt. The fact that the information was not yet provided in the form of a written
report does not negate respondent's duty to disclose the information. In addition, the respondent
knew that the victim had changed his story about the source of that semen and neglected to
inform [the defendant's] counsel. Whether or not the DNA test results were implicated in the
plea actually negotiated, the credibility of the victim certainly was an issue. Respondent's
failure to disclose the information before the first plea was inexcusable and undermined the
integrity of the criminal justice system. The failure to disclose this information violated four
Disciplinary Rules and warrants the imposition of sanctions.").
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